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The twenty-five years after 1945 witnessed the most rapid rate of  sus- 
tained economic growth the world economy has ever experienced. An 
even  more  rapid  expansion  of  international  trade  and capital flows 
accompanied and stimulated that growth. Whereas world real GNP grew 
at an average rate of  about 5.2 percent over the period 1950-70,  world 
exports in constant prices grew even faster-at  7.3 percent annually. 
The expansion era  was marked by a systematic and considerable reduc- 
tion in barriers to trade and capital movements: declining barriers stimu- 
lated international economic relations and hence national productivity 
and income  growth, and prosperity  eased the further dismantling of 
barriers. The successive GATT rounds of negotiations were the principal 
instrument of  freeing up trade, resulting in average tariffs on industrial 
products of  less than 5 percent in the European Community (EC), the 
United States, and Japan at the end of  the Tokyo Round. 
The rate of growth of  both real GNP and of trade, however, declined 
after 1973, and a widespread discussion of  protectionist pressures fol- 
lowed. In part because of the continuing multilateral trade negotiations 
and the fact that they prevented the unilateral raising of  tariffs, these 
pressures were generally for the  erection of nontariff barriers (NTBs) and 
for nonborder protection. For a variety of reasons to be discussed below, 
some of the most visible pressures and public discussion were aimed at 
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the imports  of  the developing  countries (LDCs).  To be  sure, these 
pressures did not surface without a prior history: the Multifiber Arrange- 
ment had its origins in bilateral “voluntary export restraints” (VERs) 
negotiated as early as 1955; stainless steel flatware imports were sub- 
jected to VERs in the early 1960s;  and, by the late 1960s, other commod- 
ities were either protected or there were threats of  protection.’ In the 
United States, the proposed Burke-Hartke bill of  1969 would have im- 
posed strict quantitative limits on the levels and rates of  growth of  all 
imports into the United States. Although it was defeated by  a narrow 
margin, it represents the most protectionist piece of legislation that would 
have had a reasonable possibility of  being passed by the United States 
Congress in recent times. 
Despite these earlier efforts to adopt highly restrictive measures, there 
is a widespread perception that protectionist pressures increased signifi- 
cantly in the 1970s, and that those pressures resulted in a pronounced 
increase in protection in the form of NTBs against manufactured imports 
from developing countries? 
It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the evidence on the extent of 
NTBs and their impact on manufactured imports from LDCs into de- 
veloped country (DC) markets in the 1970s. Section 11.1 sets forth the 
analytical problems that arise when direct measurement of NTBs is not 
feasible and provides a rationale for the indirect inferences used in the 
paper. Section 11.2 reviews the evidence on the incidence of protection 
by individual commodity groups. Section 11.3 examines the evidence on 
market penetration by LDCs. Section 11.4 evaluates the extent to which 
the data permit any inferences about the incidence of protection among 
developing countries.  Section  11.5 then assesses the extent to which 
protection against imports of manufactured goods from developing coun- 
tries may have increased in the 1970s. 
11.1  Estimating the Impact of NTBs 
In a world market for a given commodity which has substitutes in 
consumption or production, an effort by country A to impose a quantita- 
tive restriction on imports of that commodity from country B may fail to 
have the intended protectionist effect for a wide variety of  reasons: (1) 
the NTB may be unenforceable; (2) the exports of  country B may be 
diverted to a third  market, while the previous suppliers of  the third 
market may then ship their production of the good to the NTB-imposing 
~ountry;~  (3) the commodity in question may be a close substitute in 
production for similar, possibly higher-value items, and producers in the 
exporting country may shift their production structure toward those items 
while exporters in other countries shift their production structure toward 391  Effects of  Protection on Developing Countries’ Exports 
the item protected from B’s exports. While these last two would not be 
costless, they could substantially reduce the effects of protection. 
For all of these reasons, it is not enough to say that DCs imposed NTBs 
in the 1970s. To be sure, there are a priori grounds for believing that 
restrictive trade measures impose some costs, but that is not to say that 
they completely achieve their intended purpose. An ideal methodology 
for dealing with this problem does not in practice exist. In principle, one 
might develop a general equilibrium model of world trade (broken down 
into relevant commodity groups) and then estimate what would have 
happened to individual trade flows, given price and income elasticities, in 
the absence of protection. The difficulties inherent in this approach are 
well known and need not detain us here: it would require a careful 
modeling not only of growth paths of developing countries but also of the 
evolution of  their supply functions of  various exports; substitution in 
production and among geographic origins is so important and difficult to 
estimate that any results would be highly suspect. 
In this paper,  therefore, an alternative,  and indirect, approach  is 
adopted. We first review the highly visible NTBs for the commodity 
groups for which protection against LDC products is thought to have 
been important. We then examine the rate at which developing countries 
were able to increase their shares of  developed country markets in the 
1970s as a whole and in each half of the decade. Thereafter, evidence on 
shifts in geographic origin of  LDC imports is examined. These three 
pieces of  evidence together provide a strong, although not conclusive, 
impression that the incidence of protection against manufactured exports 
from the developing countries was probably considerably less than is 
generally believed. 
11.2  Protection against Manufactured Imports in the 1970s 
As already noted, our focus centers on protection against manufac- 
tured imports from LDCs.  We therefore ignore trade in agricultural 
products where EC  actions have clearly increasedprotection in the 1970s. 
As a partial offset, it should also be noted that protection against some 
processed primary commodities-vegetable  oils, builders’ hardware and 
plywood, etc.-decreased in the 1970s. 
We first examine trends in protection against manufactured commod- 
ities in which the LDCs have a special interest+lothing  and textiles, 
footwear and leather products, electronics, etc. Thereafter, protection 
against developed country products that has spilled over to developing 
countries is examined. Finally, other policies affecting imports of manu- 
factures  from  LDCs-export  credits  and  domestic  policies-are  ex- 
amined. The section concludes with an assessment of the overall balance. 392  Helen HughedAnne 0. Krueger 
11.2.1  Protection against Imports from LDCs4 
Clothing and  Textiles 
High tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports from developing 
countries date back to the 1920s, when the principal industrial countries 
imposed barriers against imports of  labor-intensive goods from Japan 
into their  domestic and colonial markets. These protectionist actions 
escalated in the 1930s, and protection was reintroduced in textiles as soon 
as the Japanese exports began  to recover  in  the early 1950s:  Large 
shipments of  low-cost (albeit low-quality) imports precipitated  argu- 
ments of “unfair competition from cheap labor,” and in many countries 
the textile industry, organized from the 1930s to press for protection, was 
successful in maintaining relatively high tariffs in this “sensitive” area in 
the face of  otherwise declining tariffs.  Rapidly growing clothing and 
textile imports from Hong  Kong, Taiwan, and Korea  led  to further 
protectionist  measures,  notably  to  voluntary  export  restraints  and 
orderly marketing arrangements in the early and mid-1960s. The admin- 
istrative bargaining these arrangements entailed, originally principally 
between the United States and the Far Eastern exporters, became in- 
creasingly secretive and complex, and spread to more LDC and DC 
countries. The ensuing development of protection of clothing and textiles 
was very complex. 
The producers’ trade associations in the developing countries which 
were the main exporters favored the voluntary restraint form of restric- 
tion on trade (VERs), as contrasted with higher tariffs or quotas adminis- 
tered by importing countries. VERs enabled them to appropriate the 
rents arising from restrictions when the quota implementation rested with 
them. This also suited those producers and retailers in developed coun- 
tries that had moved to subcontracting or direct investment in production 
in the LDCs, and had thereby encouraged more movement to production 
in the LDCs. The producers and importers (wholesalers and large retail- 
ers) who remained in the industrial countries countered by pressing for 
developed country import restrictions in addition to tariffs. 
The higher prices of  textiles in the developed countries induced pro- 
tected producers to invest in capital-intensive production processes and 
so to compete (at the higher price) with the producers in developing 
countries in many product lines (Shepherd 1981; Isard 1973). In some 
cases such investment led to real competitiveness through greatly im- 
proved quality in the final product, although in other cases the domestic 
price increases resulting from protection were a contributing factor. One 
of the highest wage countries in the world, Switzerland, was thus able to 
increase its high quality textile exports through the 1970s. Design and 
marketing superiority also enabled some sectors of  clothing and textiles 393  Effects of  Protection on Developing Countries’ Exports 
to remain competitive in DCs. The Italian clothing industry, for example, 
was reorganized on the original lines of the Hong Kong industry, moving 
from integrated operations to subcontracting for high-quality products, 
just as Hong Kong was moving toward more integrated production for 
mass production low- and medium-quality goods. 
Some countries-developing  and developed-were  not able to keep up 
with  the changes taking  place  in  the clothing and textile  industries. 
Traditional clothing and textile exporters, such as India, had difficulties 
filling their import quotas into the DCs, and so did some of the new Latin 
American exporters (Morawetz 1981). But a number of LDC  newcomers 
to exports  did  well  (Havrylyshyn  and  Wolf  1981; Havrylyshyn  and 
Alikhani 1982). Large producers in Hong Kong and Taiwan began to 
invest  in  production  in  Singapore, Malaysia,  and Thailand,  often in 
association with local entrepreneurs. Initially, this permitted them to 
avoid quotas, because new supplying countries were outside the restric- 
tive agreements.  Later, as exports from new geographic sources had 
increased, they obtained the right to a new quota as restrictive arrange- 
ments spread. Rents to the original producers increased because they 
remained the most efficient operators, and because they usually received 
the largest continuous (and thus most profitable) orders (Luey 1969). 
Investors from other developing countries, notably India, also began to 
invest  abroad  in  Southeast Asia  and farther afield, for  example,  in 
Mauritius, because export barriers prevented them from increasing such 
exports from  their  home bases.  More  European and Japanese firms 
began to produce offshore as developing country producers diversified 
their sales into new geographic areas. 
The protectionist measures of the 1960s became consolidated into the 
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) which, by 1978, contained provisions to 
control import growth by product  and country according to bilateral 
arrangements, supplementing the continuing high tariffs that escaped the 
successive multilateral trade negotiations (table 11.1). 
During the 1970s multifiber import quotas spread from the United 
Table 11.1  Textile Tariffs after the Tokyo Round (percent of c.i.f. price) 
Textile Mill  Apparel and Miscellaneous 
Products  Made-up Products 
Canada  15.1  21.2 
EC  8.6  12.1 
Japan  9.0  13.2 
United States  11.4  21.1 
SOURCE:  Donald B. Keesing and Martin Wolf, Textile Quotas against Developing Countries, 
Thames Essays no. 23, London: Trade Policy Research Centre, 1980. 394  Helen HughedAnne 0.  Krueger 
States to other countries and came to cover more products. In 1977-78 
the quota systems were made more comprehensive and more restrictive, 
particularly in the EC. At the same time, growth rates of  consumption 
and exports declined as DC  growth fluctuated and slowed down (Keesing 
and Wolf 1981). Reductions in protection on clothing and textiles to the 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) associated with 
the EC did little to offset the EC’s growing restrictiveness because they 
provided that either the inputs used had to be manufactured in their own 
countries or imported from the EC. This meant that clothing manufactur- 
ers could  not  use  low-cost  East Asian textiles,  severely limiting the 
advantages of their privileged market access. On balance protectionism 
in clothing and textiles increased in the 1970s in all respects: restrictions 
were applied to more products and more countries, and they were ap- 
plied more stringently. 
The producers’ surpluses accruing to the established exporters became 
evident in the growth of legal and illegal auction and other sale systems 
for export and import quotas. In some cases, notably in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, clothing and textiles were marginally priced in the highly com- 
petitive domestic markets, benefiting LDC consumers (and tourists). The 
cost of protection via VERs was borne by two groups. First ,  consumers in 
the industrial countries paid higher prices than those that would have 
prevailed in the absence of  protection. Because competition from de- 
veloping countries was greatest in low-cost mass consumption goods, the 
costs were borne primarily by low-income consumers (Jenkins 1980). 
The second group was the developing countries, although the inci- 
dence was undoubtedly uneven within countries and between them. The 
developing countries’ exports were restricted. The extent of  the restric- 
tions is moot. The existing leading countries moved up-market in clothing 
and textiles and diversified out of these products. Whether they would 
have moved more rapidly or slowly without the rents and restrictions of 
protectionism it is impossible to know. Export growth from “new” coun- 
tries was also restricted, but some may have benefited from the limita- 
tions placed  on the principal  exporters. The new countries obtained 
investment, which combined capital with technology and marketing skills 
that they may not otherwise have obtained, and more generally were able 
to enter and compete in markets in which prices were raised by protec- 
tion. 
Overall, developed country consumers clearly were adversely affected 
by restrictions on textile and apparel imports. Developing countries as a 
group probably also lost, although they did receive the rents on VERs in 
at least partial compensation. One further factor relevant for assessing 
the probably future impact of  protection should be noted: during the 
1970s, Japan was reducing its net exports of  textiles and apparel. This 
undoubtedly eased the impact of  the MFA. This feature will no longer 395  Effects of  Protection on Developing Countries’ Exports 
serve as a buffer in the future. To what extent it mitigated protection is 
difficult to evaluate. 
Footwear and Leather Products 
Footwear was also a “sensitive” industry in Europe, the United States, 
and Canada by the mid-l960s, with exports again first originating princi- 
pally from the Far East and then diversifying rapidly across developing 
countries. Tariffs had remained relatively high through the 1960s, VERs 
and OMAs were common, and there was pressure to increase quantita- 
tive restrictions in the 1970s. 
Protection was, however, less effective than in the clothing and textile 
industry. Footwear is a smaller industry than textiles, and it consists of 
smaller firms with frequent entry and exit. Many firms, including some of 
the larger ones, were not able to handle the major changes in taste to 
informal footwear that became marked from the mid-l960s, and pressure 
for protection eased with their exit from the industry. Some firms moved 
part of their production abroad or used imported components. Industrial 
country firms were able to continue to compete in the high-quality upper 
end of the market by using their advantages in design and craftsmanship, 
and there was little investment in new capital-intensive technology. Pro- 
tection  did  not  increase appreciably in the  1970s, and it  is doubtful 
whether it had any effect on production trends in the industry in the 
United States (Mutti and Bale 1980). Thus when the principal NTBs were 
removed in the United States in 1981  there was relatively little organized 
opposition from the industry, and there seems to have been no major 
change in production trends. 
Protection on other leather products such as handbags was probably 
even less effective. It has been even more sporadic than that on footwear. 
Some producers from industrial countries were able to compete effec- 
tively through design and craftsmanship at the top end of  the market 
(U.S. International Trade Commission 1982), but protectionist efforts 
did not succeed in preventing rapid expansion in imports. 
Electronic Products,  Cutlery, Hand  Tools, Etc. 
As the developing countries widened their range of export products in 
the late 1960s, calls for protection were heard in response to increases in 
imports of  a variety of  goods. Manufacturers in Europe and the United 
States complained about growing imports of  metal products, such as 
cutlery, hand tools, and even barbers’ chairs. They were successful in 
having some partial, and often also temporary, restrictions imposed on 
imports, but the coverage was limited and it is doubtful whether restric- 
tions were very effective. Then electronic products became the focus of 
attention. 
Electronics assembly moved offshore in many developed countries in 396  Helen HughedAnne 0. Krueger 
the late 1960s and early 1970s and, in addition, local entrepreneurs began 
to produce electronic goods in Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong in the 
1970s. Large electronics  firms in  developed countries had  conflicting 
interests: they wanted  to encourage some types of  imports, but they 
simultaneously wanted protection against others. In the United States, 
Zenith was the only major firm not to move production overseas until the 
early 1980s, when it too was forced to do so by competition from other 
U.S.  producers and from Japanese and other imports. There were pro- 
tests against imports in most of the industrial countries, and some restric- 
tive actions followed, mostly of  the VER-OMA type  but with some 
increases in tariffs as well. 
However, those measures were too partial and spasmodic to reverse 
the trend in the DCs toward the substitution of imports for local produc- 
tion in a growing range of products. Indeed, electronics firms, which had 
mostly started as assembly operations in LDCs, extended their activities 
deeper into manufacturing processes, even where this involved technol- 
ogy-intensive microprocessing. Although some observers forecast that 
the likely impact of changing electronics technology would result in the 
industry’s relocation in the DCs in the mid-1970s, this has not happened. 
There was apparently more talk of an increase in VERs and OMAs in the 
mid-1970s than impact. The electronic, cutlery, hand tool, and other 
machine exports from LDCs were further diversified and expanded, but 
parts of these industries also remained competitively located in industrial 
countries. The trend was even more strongly toward intra-industry trade 
than in clothing, textiles, and footwear. 
Miscellaneous  Products 
The miscellaneous group of manufacturing which includes toys, sport- 
ing goods,  and musical instruments had  a fairly large proportion  of 
developing country exports from the 1960s, and it continued to grow 
rapidly in the 1970s. The competition these products faced in industrial 
countries came from relatively small industry groups and relatively small 
firms. In some cases the industrial country industry was practically wiped 
out. Baseball bats and gloves in the United States are an example. In 
others, such as musical instruments, developed country firms remained 
competitive. But little protectionist fervor was generated from the declin- 
ing firms, and intra-industry trade largely developed on lines of compara- 
tive advantage in a widening circle of  “industries.” 
11.2.2  Protection against DC Products That Also 
Affects LDC Manufactured Exports 
In the mid-l970s, the focus of protectionist pressure swung from manu- 
factured goods originating in LDCs to those from DCs. The bulk of 
protective measures taken were against imports of steel and automobiles. 397  Effects of  Protection on Developing Countries’ Exports 
Japan was the initial target, but in the late 1970s recriminations also arose 
between the United States and the EC over steel, petrochemicals, and 
associated industries. A few developing countries, notably Brazil and 
Korea, have been caught in these disputes because to a limited extent 
they are also competitors. This is particularly true in steel (Kamahito 
1981):  And other developing countries are affected insofar as they are 
potential entrants or suppliers of  raw material inputs whose demand is 
reduced by higher output prices. 
The problems of these industries date back to the nineteenth century, 
and already once, in the 1930s, led to serious difficulties. It can plausibly 
be argued that the difficulties these industries are experiencing originate 
more in the domestic economies and structure of  the industries than in 
trade itself. It is in defense of such industries that VERs, OMAs, and new 
protective measures such as the Trigger Price Mechanism for steel have 
spread. 
The distribution of benefits and costs of these arrangements vary. With 
the Trigger Price Mechanism the protected countries’ producers seem to 
have benefited, at least in the short run. The costs are very considerable. 
Protection for steel is inevitably followed by demands for protection in 
steel-using industries that compete internationally. Thus while the high 
cost of steel may be passed on to consumers by the construction industry, 
the competitiveness of producers of automobiles and domestic consumer 
durable goods suffers as consumers choose cheaper imports. Where the 
industry concerned has large employment but is dominated by a small 
number of  firms, it demands-and  often receives-further  protection. 
But since the protected industries are large, the increases in costs are 
correspondingly high. To date, however, it would appear that those costs 
have been borne by  the developed countries themselves and have not 
impacted significantly on LDC exports.’ 
11.2.3  Administered Protection 
Another effect of the increasing pressures for protection has been the 
establishment of a considerable bureaucracy in the industrial countries. It 
sifts, interprets, sends through legal processes (in the case of  the United 
States), and evaluates the demand for protection under dozens of differ- 
ent  rubrics.  In  the  EC two-fold  layers  of  national  and  community 
bureaucracies deal with protection. 
One of the reasons for the difficulty of evaluating administered protec- 
tion is that its formats differ so widely. The more transparent the adminis- 
tration of  protection, the less protective, but also the more public it is 
likely to be. Countries such as the United States and Australia appear to 
be relatively protectionist because they have more transparent systems of 
protection than Japan and the EC. Yet it is clear that Australia, except 
for clothing, footwear, and motor vehicles, reduced its protection sub- 398  Helen Hughes/Anne 0.  Krueger 
stantially in the 1970s (Anderson and Garnaut). For the United States, 
requests for protection handled by such agencies as the International 
Trade Commission (ITC) and the Treasury were quite numerous, and the 
White  House  was  involved  in  a  number  of  trade  policy  decisions. 
Nonetheless, the overall impact of  these measures was limited (Finger 
1981, 1982; Finger, Hall, and Nelson 1982). 
Evaluating EC trends is even more difficult. Apart from increasing 
protection against agricultural imports almost continuously, and against 
clothing and textiles in 1977, individual members of the EC, and the EC 
itself, introduced a large number of measures, many of them, however, of 
small effect and limited duration. Although all countries agreed to the 
several EC-wide increases in protection, not all implemented them. With 
the free flow  of  goods within  the EC, imports flowed into  member 
countries which did not implement the EC decisions to be sold also in 
those that did. A listing of the measures taken in countries such as Italy 
(Grilli 1980) would suggest that imports from developing countries were 
restricted. Yet overall, several analysts have concluded that there seems 
to have been little actual increase in the degree of  restriction resulting 
from administered protection against imports from developing countries 
(Anjaria et al. 1981; Gard and Riedel 1980). If  protection had signifi- 
cantly increased, the ACP States that received a great deal of preferential 
treatment might have been expected to have had booming exports, but 
this has not been the case. 
Japan’s system of  administered protection is very opaque, even to 
Japanese scholars. However, discussions with Korean exporters indicate 
that the weight of  administrative action in the 1970s was used to open 
markets to developing countries. The exception was traditional semi- 
handicraft  products,  especially silk, which  was  restricted.  However, 
Japan’s distribution system is heavily biased  against imports (Yasugi 
1980). The government began to plan reforms in the early 1970s  but failed 
to carry them out because of  reduced national growth rates and threat- 
ened unemployment. In that sense it failed to reduce protection with 
considerable costs to consumers. 
11.2.4  Suppliers’ Export Credit Subsidies 
A major area of protection that has received little attention is export 
subsidies. These are protective of domestic producers when their magni- 
tude permits producers to export profitably who would otherwise be 
unable  to do so. In  the context of  protection  against manufactured 
exports from LDCs, these subsidies may permit DC exporters to retain 
market shares when, in their absence, LDC exports would rise more 
rapidly. 
Some export subsidies are granted directly to the exporting firm and 399  Effects of  Protection on Developing Countries’ Exports 
these are impossible to trace. A significant, but also, unknown, volume 
takes the form of  direct or indirect (through central bank discounts or 
public  insurance)  subsidies  to  exporters.  Suppliers’ credits  grew  in 
volume in the 1970s as trade grew, but the subsidy element declined as 
real interest rates fell, rising again as interest rates rose after 1979. The 
total volume of subsidy through export credits is estimated as having risen 
from $330 million to $3.5 billion from 1976 to 1980 (Fleisig and Hill, this 
volume). 
Although export credit subsidies are always distortive of trade among 
industrial countries, it was argued in the 1950s and 1960s that the de- 
veloping countries benefited  because they were exporters of  primary 
products and labor-intensive nondurable consumer goods, and importers 
of capital goods. This is, however, no longer the case. Developing coun- 
tries appear to have a comparative advantage in producing “one-of ” 
capital goods such as ships, oil rigs, hydroelectric generators, and special- 
ized earth-moving machines (in contrast to mass-produced equipment). 
Those activities require relatively large inputs of  skilled labor, such as 
draftsmen, technicians, and engineers whose wages are still low in de- 
veloping countries. This type of  export production has been developing 
for some twenty years, but the technological innovations that led to the 
use of numerically controlled machine tools have greatly speeded it up by 
enabling skilled workers to be trained in six months instead of  six years. 
Developing countries exporting such capital goods have to borrow 
abroad to finance exports in order for them to be competitive with the 
industrial country subsidies on suppliers’ credits. This is clearly a case 
where the final consumers benefits, the taxpayers of exporting countries 
pay the cost of subsidy, developing countries’ exports are disadvantaged, 
but developing countries importing capital goods may benefit. 
11.2.5  Nonborder Protection 
As protectionist pressures for high tariffs and quantitative and other 
import restrictions were mostly defeated in the 1950s and 1960s, protec- 
tionist interests sought subsidies for domestic production. The arguments 
for subsidies followed the traditional protectionist and mercantilist cases 
for import substitution and export growth, with a heavy weight being 
given to  employment issues. This was particularly important in the case of 
“senile” industries such as textiles and shipbuilding. “Regional balance” 
became another rationale for local and national subsidies. Federal sys- 
tems were particularly prone to this approach. Even the relatively liberal 
Federal Republic of  Germany had many state subsidies (Donges 1980). 
The principal  forms of  subsidy or nonborder  protection  were  the 
following: 
a) Favored tax treatment and other subsidies for research  and de- 400  Helen HughedAnne 0.  Krueger 
velopment were used in an effort to stimulate technological advances, 
“pick the winners,” implement “positive structural adjustment ,” and 
change the comparative advantage of  senile industries. 
b) Nationalization, initially advocated to take over the “commanding 
heights” of the economy, was used instead to take over floundering firms. 
It was either done directly with deficits in  the public budget  or the 
industries were instead assisted by subsidies, particularly in such oligopo- 
listic sectors as steel and automobiles. 
c)  Regional taxation exemptions and cash subsidies were enacted to 
enable firms to move to areas where they otherwise could not operate 
efficiently. 
d)  Subsidy support was used in the mid-1970s  for “senile” industries to 
avoid unemployment and maintain exports. 
The extent of  such subsidies is not known. Except for a few years and 
industries there are not even complete enumerations, and there are only 
very partial quantifications of the effects. The microeconomic impact was 
almost certainly more serious than the macroeconomic impact, but trad- 
ing partners were deprived of markets and the industrial countries them- 
selves were hence injured as exporters. There were high budgetary costs. 
For example, in the late 1970s it is estimated that it cost about $45,000 a 
year to maintain a job in the Swedish shipbuilding industry that paid a 
worker $20,000 (Hamilton 1981a). 
In theory, subsidies may be preferred to their tariff equivalent or other 
import restrictions because they are more direct and more transparent. In 
practice this was not generally the case in  the early  and mid-1970s. 
Budgetary controls proved to be very lax in the boom years, and there is a 
marked absence of  ex post analysis of  the costs and benefits of  R&D 
expenditures, subsidies to “pick the winners,” and so on? Budgets fre- 
quently lumped together subsidy sums for various purposes, leaving it to 
administrators to pick the “winning” firms or industries. 
However, by the late 1970s, the available evidence suggests that under 
the pressure of declining national growth the peak of subsidization, and 
nonborder  protection  generally, had  been  passed  (Hamilton  1981b; 
Yonezawa  1980). The pressure for budgetary restraints led to greater 
scrutiny,  particularly  where  fiscally  conservative  governments  were 
elected. In most countries, even if  subsidy budgets were not actually 
reduced, they ceased to grow with other expenditures by the early 1980s. 
Nonborder protection probably largely canceled out among the indus- 
trial countries. Indeed, the biggest effect may have been the costs of 
imposing protection  and the reduced  incentives for  efficiency in  the 
protection-imposing countries. If  everything is protected, nothing is pro- 
tected. Some firms may have obtained windfall rents from which capital, 
management, and labor benefited. But consumers had to pay more, and 
taxpayers had to support production. The developing countries probably 401  Effects of  Protection on Developing Countries’ Exports 
gained in some cases but lost in others. Export competition may have 
been more difficult for potential LDC exporters in some industries, but to 
the extent that subsidies went to marginal, inefficient firms, the immedi- 
ate  impact was to make competition easier by raising prices. Shipbuilding 
is an example of  an industry  which shifted location  despite massive 
subsidies. 
11.2.6  The Balance 
In the next two sections, we evaluate data on the behavior of  LDC- 
manufactured exports in an effort to ascertain how effective protection 
may have been. Based on the evidence concerning the ability of the LDCs 
to maintain exports in  the face of  increased  protection  in the DCs, 
pessimists could conclude that export growth from developing countries 
was halted in the latter part of the 1970s. However, even pessimists might 
have expected the ACP countries to benefit by trade diversion from other 
developing country producers (although there are questions about supply 
elasticities in  those countries).  Optimists, on the other hand, might 
conclude that the underlying trends continued to be in the direction of 
liberal trade, mainly because of the success of  the multilateral rounds of 
trade negotiation. 
The threat of protection was considerable, but it can be argued that the 
cost of the protectionist measures taken was borne largely by the domes- 
tic economies of  the industrial countries, with serious protective effects 
on the developing countries’ exports confined to the textile and apparel 
industry? Even optimists would, however, be likely to conclude that the 
Far Eastern exporters would have been most injured because the bulk of 
the protectionist measures were taken against them. It is clear that trade 
would have grown faster and everyone would have been better off with an 
even more rapid reduction of  overall protection.  Some of  the losses, 
moreover, may have been through the impact on investment decisions of 
the uncertainty that was engendered in developing countries by protec- 
tion. 
11.3  Market Penetration Trends in the 1970s 
One indirect  check on  the impact  of  protectionist  measures is  to 
examine the  growth  of  LDC exports and their  shares of  developed 
country markets. The data used for this purpose combine production data 
in eleven industrial countries with export and import data to calculate 
apparent consumption for some 150 product groups1o  and classify trade 
origin and destination by principal trading groups. Table 11.2 shows the 
growth of  LDC manufactured exports during the 1970s.” 
LDC exports of  manufactures to DCs grew at nearly 11 percent per 
annum in the 1970s, with the fastest growth occurring in metal products, 402  Helen HughedAnne 0.  Krueger 
Table 11.2  Product Composition of Developing Countries’ Manufactured 
Exports to Industrial Countries, 1970-80 
ISIC 
Average 
Annual  Share 
Real  of 
US$  Growth  Total 
(billion)  Rate”  (percent) 
1970  1980  1970-80  1970  1980 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 
32  Textile, wearing apparel and 
leather industries 
33 Manufacture of wood and wood 
products,  including furniture 
34  Manufacture of paper and 
paper products: Printing 
and publishing 
35 Manufacture of  chemicals and 
of chemical, petroleum, coal, 
rubber and plastic products 
36  Manufacture of  nonmetallic 
mineral products, except prod- 
ducts of petroleum and coal 
37  Basic metal industries 
38  Manufacture of fabricated 
metal products, machinery 
and equipment 
39  Miscellaneous manufacturing 
industries 



















































SOURCE:  World Bank, Market Penetration research project data, for this and following 
tables. 
“Growth rates were calculated by  least-squares  method. Deflated  by industrial country 
GDP deflators. 
machinery (including electronic products), nonmetallic minerals (partic- 
ularly glassware and ceramics), paper and printing (from a low base), 
chemicals,  and clothing, textiles, and leather. In gross output terms, 
chemicals became the principal product exported. However, textiles and 
metal products and machinery, which have a much higher value added in 
production, were economically more important. The relative share of 
food products  declined, in part reflecting inelastic demand, but  also 
because of  high and increasing protection in the EC. Given the extent of 403  Effects of  Protection on  Developing Countries’ Exports 
protection against the clothing and textiles group, and its increase in the 
1970s, the rapid rate of growth of textile exports is somewhat surprising. 
It is even more surprising that the Far Eastern exporters, against whom 
much of  the protection was directed, remained successful. Table 11.3 
indicates that the Far Eastern exporters increased their share of  total 
exports, largely at the expense of  Latin American countries whose ex- 
ports of  food products (mainly coffee) declined markedly in real terms, 
but also at the expense of “old” southern European exporters and such 
countries as India and Pakistan. The ASEAN group made the principal 
gains in addition to the Far Eastern exporters (particularly if  Singapore is 
excluded), and so did a number of small countries such as Mauritius and 
Malta. Among the Latin American countries Brazil did well in paper, 
nonmetallic mineral products,  base  metals  and  metal products,  and 
machinery, but all from a relatively small base. 
It may be objected that the 1970-80  data conceal the intradecade shift 
in trends. That this was not markedly the case is evidenced by the data in 
table 11.4. Imports into the industrial countries from developing coun- 
tries grew rapidly, and much more so than imports from other industrial 
countries throughout the decade, although growth in developing country 
market penetration was more rapid in the early 1970s than in the later 
1970s. The bulk of the decline in growth (except in textiles in the EC,  see 
below) can probably be explained by faltering growth in the industrial 
countries. Market penetration growth of  LDCs continued to be much 
faster than total import growth in the later period despite protectionist 
measures. 
Table 11.5 shows the shares of the developing countries in developed 
country markets. With the exception of  Australia and Canada, the in- 
dustrial countries markedly increased the openness of their economy in 
the 1970s, as measured by import shares. 
Market penetration varied considerably by country in 1970 and so did 
market penetration growth rates for the 1970s. The initial level of market 
penetration, a country7s  overall growth (and hence its growth of imports), 
and the overall impact of  policies were clearly important, but so  were 
supply conditions not captured by these data. 
Japan had the  lowest share of imports from all sources in its economy in 
1970, and this was still true in  1980. Given its location in East Asia, 
moreover,  it had a surprisingly low share of  imports from developing 
countries and relatively low growth of  such imports in the 1970s. Price 
comparisons suggest that for many goods this is not the result of  the 
competitiveness of Japanese production, but rather that Japan’s distribu- 
tion system is a more effective barrier  to trade than other forms of 
protection. However, the products that the Far Eastern LDCs were 
exporting were precisely those in which Japan was earlier preeminent. As Table 11.3  Manufactured Exports of Developing Countries to Industrial Countries, by Origin and Product Groups, 1970-80 
All  Percent Share of  Exports from 
Developing 
Countries  Other 
(US$  Southern  Far  Latin  Developing 
billion)  Europe”  Eastb  America  Countries  (ASEAN)b  ISIC 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 
Growth rate: 











































(36.3)  Growth rate: 
33  Manufacture of  wood and wood 
products, including furniture 
Growth rate: 
34  Manufacture of  paper and 








































16.0  Growth rate: 
35  Manufacture of  chemicals and 
of  chemical, petroleum, coal, 





















Growth rate: 36  Manufacture of  nonmetallic 
mineral products, except prod- 
ucts of  petroleum and coal 
Growth rate: 
37  Basic metal industries 
Growth rate: 
38  Manufacture of  fabricated 
metal products, machinery 
and equipment 
Growth rate: 
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 
industries 
Growth rate: 











































































































aSouthern Europe consists of  Andorra, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Greece, Israel, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia 
bFar East: Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore; ASEAN: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. Singapore is thus included in 
both groups, and the other ASEAN countries are also included in “other developing countries.” The ASEAN group is duplicative. 406  Helen HughesJAnne 0. Krueger 
Table 11.4  Import Growth in Industrial Countries,  1970-75,  1975-80 and 
1970-80  (average annual growth) 
Growth of  Import Shares 
Imports 
Imports  Imports  from European 
from  from  Centrally 
Industrial  Developing  Planned 




4.9  9.7  10.9 
3.2  7.0  3.7 
3.6  7.2  6.3 
Value of  imports in 
1980 ($US billion)  610  152  20 
such the Japanese net export balance was diminishing and reductions in 
exports are not reflected in the data. 
Belgium, Sweden, and the United Kingdom had the lowest growth 
rates in market penetration from developing countries in the 1970s, but 
they all started from relatively high initial levels. Australia, the Nether- 
lands, France, and the United States had the highest increase in import 
penetration. The Netherlands also started at a high level of penetration in 
1970. Its high growth of imports from developing countries thus reflected 
policy commitment and the effectiveness of its implementation policies. 
In France, the GSP and special bilateral arrangements with Southern 
Europe, the Maghreb, Africa South of  the Sahara, and the Caribbean 
encouraged imports from those areas, which still accounted for more than 
two-thirds of  imports in 1980. Yet despite policy biases in favor of  the 
latter  countries  and  against  the  Far  East,  the  East  Asian  exporters 
continued to increase their share of French markets by 23 percent a year 
in 1975-80. 
Most of  the industry groups and subgroups show the same general 
patterns as the overall trends. This is reflected in the data presented in 
table  11.6. In all categories of  manufactures, the LDC shares of  DC 
imports increased. Despite protection, the increase was rapid for textiles, 
clothing, footwear, TV  and radio, and the other groups subject to  protec- 
tion. As already noted, the developing countries’ gains in processed food, 
beverages, and tobacco products were minimal. They increased their 
market penetration  (table 11.6; Duncan  and Lutz  1982) by  only  1.5 
percent  a  year  in  the  1970s in  that  category.  For  all manufactures, 
however, the rate of increase in share was over 7 percent a year-hardly 
evidence of  trade restrictions having been highly effective. 
One of the reasons why protective measures had relatively little impact 
on overall import performance  was the diversification of  developing Table 11.5  Share of  Developing Country Imports in the Apparent Consumption of Manufactured Goods, in Eleven Industrial Countries, 
1970-80  (percent) 
Share in Apparent Consumption  Growth of  Import Shares 
1970  1980"  197C-1980' 
Imports  Imports  Imports 
from  from  from 
All  Developing  All  Developing  All  Developing 




























































































"Preliminary data subject to revision. 




1970  1980  Import Penetration 
Total Imports  M  Growth 
1970  1980  O+M-X  1970-80 
ISIC  (US$ billion)  (percent)  (percent per annum) 
31 Food  7.5  27.6  3.5  3.7  1.5 
32  Clothing, textiles 
and footwear  3.4  31.4  3.1  10.5  13.1 
322 Clothing  1.4  16.6  4.0  16.3  15.0 
321 Textiles  1.5  8.9  2.3  5.4  8.6 
324 Footwear  0.2  3.2  2.6  16.3  18.9 
323 Leather products  0.3  2.7  6.2  17.3  11.5 
33 Wood products  0.8  5.6  1.9  3.6  7.1 
34 Paper  0.2  1.6  0.2  0.5  11.9 
35 Chemicals  3.6  37.5  2.0  3.8  5.7 
36  Nonmetallic 
minerals  0.1  1.4  0.3  1.1  13.8 
37  Base metals  4.0  15.1  3.5  4.1  2.1 
38 Machinery  1.6  28.5  0.4  2.1  17.6 
3811 Cutlery & 
hand tools  0.1  0.9  0.8  3.3  15.6 
3812 Metal furniture  0.03  0.2  0.6  1.6  9.5 
3832 Radio, TV, etc.  0.5  9.2  1.6  7.2  18.6 
39  Other manufactured products  0.5  3.1  4.0  8.0  9.4 
Total  21.7  151.9  1.7  3.4  7.2 409  Effects of  Protection on Developing Countries' Exports 
country exports by product. The most rapid increases in market penetra- 
tion came in machinery and nonmetallic mineral products  (including 
china and glassware). Another high growth sector is the miscellaneous 
group that includes sports equipment, toys, and musical instruments. 
Nonetheless, clothing, textiles, and footwear still rank high on the list 
despite their  relatively high  market  penetration  in  1970 and despite 
textile protectionism. 
The  low correlation between the extensive import controls particularly 
designed to limit the growth of imports from the Far East and the increase 
in market penetration by the Far Eastern countries supports the hypoth- 
esis that administrative protection is not only costly, but also largely 
ineffective. 
This is illustrated by the continuing strength of the Far Eastern export- 
ers (table 11.7). Their market penetration growth was exceeded in 1970- 
75 and for the 1970s as a whole by the ASEAN group of the second-wave 
exporters and by some other newcomers (Havrylyshyn and Wolf 1981; 
Havrylyshyn and Alikhani 1982). However, when competition became 
tougher in more growing markets in the late 1970s, and although protec- 
tion was mainly directed specifically against the Far Eastern exporters, 
they were able to compete and expand exports more rapidly than other 
countries, notably those of  Southern Europe and Latin America. 
11.4  The Impact of  Protection on Suppliers 
The  primary and immediate impact of protection (to the extent that it is 
effective) is to reduce imports from those suppliers against which the 
protection  is directed.  But this is only the first step in a long chain 
affecting both demand and all sources of supply. As a first step toward 
disentangling these effects, table 11.8 indicates the changes in the share 
of  imports of  clothing, textile, and footwear markets into the United 
Table 11.7  Market Penetration Growth by Developing Country Groups, 
1970-75,  1975-80, and 1970-80 
Volume of 
Imports 
197G75  1975-80  1970-80  1970  1980 
(average annual growth rates)  (US$ million) 
Southern Europe  11.4  7.2  7.6  3  23 
Far East"  16.4  10.0  12.7  3  39 
ASEAN"  21.9  9.6  13.3  1  18 
Latin America  7.2  4.3  4.7  8  41 
"Far East: Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,  and Singapore. ASEAN: Indonesia,  Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore.  Singapore is thus included in both groups. rable 11.8  Clothing, Textile and Footwear Import Shares by Principal Exporting Groups and Importing DCs, 1970-80 (percent) 
U.S.  EC  Japan 
1970  1976  1978  1980  1970  1976  1978  1980  1970  1976  1978  1980 







Eastern European countries 
(ASEAN) 
Total share of  imports" 
42.9  62.0  60.7  64.0  12.4  19.5  17.2  17.9  55.4 
4.5  2.3  1.7  0.9  6.2  12.6  13.2  13.6  0.8 
4.3  10.5  10.3  9.2  0.1  1  .o  0.9  0.9  0.2 
4.2  7.8  10.9  14.5  1.7  6.9  7.8  10.7  15.0 
43.9  15.8  14.3  10.2  75.9  53.9  55.4  51.8  27.8 
0.2  1.6  2.1  1.2  3.7  6.1  5.5  5.1  0.8 
(4.3)  (5.5)  (7.5)  (7.3)  (0.1)  (1.8)  (2.0)  (2.6)  (0.5) 









65.3  50.9 
1.2  0.8 
0.2  0.1 
9.9  20.1 
23.2  27.9 
0.2  0.2 
(0.9)  (1.8) 







Eastern European countries 
(ASEAN) 
Total share of  importsa 







Eastern European countries 
(ASEAN) 
Total share of  importsa 
6.4  14.0  11.5  14.0  2.2  3.1  2.7  2.7  26.7  36.0  37.4  29.9 
3.3  2.1  2.1  1.9  3.6  6.0  6.4  6.6  0.7  0.2  0.3  0.4 
4.5  9.3  10.7  9.7  0.9  2.5  2.3  2.5  2.1  3.1  2.0  2.3 
18.5  22.3  20.4  25.5  7.6  8.5  9.2  10.6  23.9  22.8  26.9  26.6 
66.7  51.1  53.8  47.3  84.0  77.7  77.3  75.7  44.3  36.2  32.2  39.9 
0.6  2.2  1.5  1.6  1.7  2.2  2.1  1.9  2.3  1.7  1.2  0.9 
(0.6)  (2.8)  (2.6)  (2.6)  (0.1)  (9.0)  (0.9)  (0.9)  (1.6)  (2.4)  (2.2)  (3.1) 
4.5  4.1  4.7  4.4  17.4  27.2  30.5  33.7  4.0  6.2  7.3  7.4 
3.0  29.3  32.9  38.1  5.0  5.6  5.4  8.1  27.4  67.0  74.3  60.3 
16.8  19.9  15.0  10.7  5.8  12.4  11.8  11.9  4.7  2.4  1.5  3.9 
3.5  15.2  13.5  15.7  0.3  1.5  2.7  2.3  0.0  1.2  0.4  2.3 
1  .0  1.5  2.0  3.3  1.5  2.0  2.5  3.7  2.7  3.6  3.2  8.0 
74.2  31.0  33.2  28.4  83.4  73.9  73.7  62.5  64.5  25.6  20.5  25.4 
1.5  3.1  3.4  3.8  4.0  4.6  3.9  2.5  0.7  0.2  0.1  0.1 
(0.2)  (0.2)  (1.2)  (1.6)  (0.2)  (0.4)  (0.4)  (0.5)  (0.1)  (0.4)  (0.2)  (1.3) 
7.1  7.2  9.8  13.3  26.9  38.9  35.7  19.7  37.5  40.9  47.9  2.4 
aTotal share of  imports in apparent consumption. 412  Helen HughedAnne 0. Krueger 
States, the European Community, and Japan by principal suppliers in the 
late 1970s. 
It is clear that despite the presumed intent to protect DC  suppliers, the 
DCs on the whole continued to lose their share both of total markets as 
domestic suppliers and of  other countries’ markets. In some markets, 
notably U.S. textiles and footwear, the growth rate of imports as a share 
of apparent consumption declined, but at the high levels already reached, 
this may have been in part a consequence of market trends as penetration 
into high-quality markets became more difficult. The DCs also failed to 
make significant gains in their mutual trade except in clothing in Japan 
where their share of  imports recovered to the 1970 level. 
The primary impact of  protection ought to have been to reduce the 
share of  imports from the Far East, but this was true only to a minor 
degree in the EC in clothing, textiles, and footwear after 1976. In the 
United States the Far Eastern countries’ share of  clothing and textiles 
fluctuated, but it continued to rise in footwear. In Japan the Far Eastern 
exporters also lost clothing and textile shares but gained in footwear. In 
all three geographic markets, the Far Eastern exporters gained in other 
products. 
It is impossible to determine the extent to which these trends resulted 
from protection and the extent to which they were the result of changing 
supply conditions. Where the elasticity of  supply is high as in the Far 
East, entrepreneurs diversify exports geographically, move “up-market’’ 
to higher quality goods in the product group in question, and diversify 
their product range. The Far Eastern exporters were doing all this from 
the  beginning of the 1970s,  and it is impossible to gauge exactly how much 
the post-1976 protectionism accelerated such diversification. 
In Hong Kong the diversification was largely the result  of  private 
initiatives, in Taiwan private initiative was supported by public liberaliza- 
tion measures, and Singapore and Korea made major, but very different, 
policy interventions. Singapore raised real wages between 1978 and 1981 
by  10 percent a year to push entrepreneurs up-market and drive out 
marginal  low-labor-productivity  firms that  were  unable to make  the 
move. Real wage increases, reflecting productivity gains, were having the 
same impact in Korea up to the mid-l970s, but then continued to rise 
rapidly  largely because  of  the excessively capital- and technical-skill- 
intensive orientation of  government policy. Whereas diversification in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan came smoothly, Korea’s policy, 
combined with the lack of confidence arising out of political problems and 
failure to liberalize the economy, resulted in its lagging behind the other 
Far Eastern exporters in moving up-market within the relatively labor- 
intensive production categories (it led to other economic problems as 
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The principal expansion of  labor-intensive exports came from three 
ASEAN countries-Thailand,  Malaysia, and the Philippines-and  from 
Southern Europe. The “old” developing country exporters-India  and 
Pakistan-failed  to take marked advantage of the protection against the 
Far Eastern countries, and so, on the whole, did Latin America. China 
began to make a major effort to increase exports at the very bottom of the 
low-quality, labor-intensive range at the end of  the 1970s, and a large 
number of  small new exporters such as Mauritius, Sri Lanka, and Mo- 
rocco, and even including on a small scale a number of  countries from 
Africa South of the Sahara (Ivory Coast, Botswana, Malawi) also began 
to export manufactured goods. The latter group benefited from ACP 
preferential treatment (though as already noted, their competitiveness 
was limited by lack of  access to cheap raw materials under ACP rules). 
Investment in the “new” exporting countries (if they sought it) was also 
accelerated by the phenomenon of  “quota seekers,” as noted earlier. 
These trends do not, however, mean that protection was costless, only 
that the costs to developing countries were less than might have been 
expected. Unrestricted  markets could have led to even faster export 
growth because prices would have been lower without distorting rents, 
and living standards would have risen faster in the DCs and in the Far 
East. Given the considerable evidence of  a high elasticity of  substitution 
in production, up-market movement and other diversifications would 
have most probably occurred in the Far East in any case, together with 
investment in the second-echelon countries, so that an even greater effect 
would have been achieved than with protection and at higher standards of 
living. The ACP countries could have been assisted at lower cost and on a 
larger scale than has been the case to date. 
11.5  Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Work 
Based on the export performance of the developing countries in manu- 
factured goods during the 1970s, it is difficult to infer that increasing 
protection  was the dominant factor at work. To be sure, developing 
countries would have fared better (except possibly for the established 
exporters of textiles and clothing who received the rents under VERs) in 
the absence of protectionist measures. Yet, the overwhelming impression 
is that despite all the public discussion of  protection and the political 
pressures for it, the effects on imports of manufactures from developing 
countries of  protectionist measures were relatively small. The rate of 
increase of  LDC market shares was sufficiently  great that it is difficult to 
imagine that rates would have been significantly higher in the absence of 
any protectionist measures. 
This leaves economists with an apparent puzzle: on one hand, protec- 414  Helen HughedAnne 0.  Krueger 
tion is decried as necessarily welfare decreasing; yet it is difficult to infer 
sizeable effects on trade patterns,  except possibly among sources of 
exports, to which we return below. Perhaps the answer lies in noting that 
the deleterious effects of interventions with free trade that are generally 
cited  refer  to the  adverse welfare  consequences  for  the protection- 
imposing countries. Insofar as there was a spread of protectionism in the 
1970s, it would appear that the greater welfare losses were to the protect- 
ing countries, rather than to the rest of the world. It seems probable that 
this is the appropriate verdict on the protection of  the 1970s: interven- 
tions in support of  declining industries in the developed countries un- 
doubtedly permitted the survival of  some activities longer than would 
have been economically warranted. The economic costs of  the survival 
may have been high, but they (and the consumption costs of protection) 
would have been borne by the developed countries themselves. 
The geographic incidence of  protectionist measures across developing 
countries remains an interesting and unresolved question. Would Korea 
have moved up-market in textiles more rapidly or more slowly in the 
absence of  the MFA? Would Mauritius have entered the international 
textile market sooner or later in the absence of  the MFA? Did VERs 
keep the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of the Far East exporting 
the same commodities longer than they otherwise would have? How 
important was the Japanese reduction in exports of the NIC commodities 
as a buffer to the impact VERs would otherwise have had? 
On this score, the evidence is not yet  in. Further research on the 
industrial organization of the exporting industries subject to protection in 
the NICs would undoubtedly shed further light on the issue. So, too, 
would research on the behavior of  costs of  the protected firms in de- 
veloped countries, and the extent to which the industry structure changed 
under protection. 
While there remain many unsettled questions, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that, at least in the 1970s, protectionist actions were not suf- 
ficient to prevent those developing countries with open economies from 
significantly increasing their share of  world markets. How much more 
they could have done in the absence of protectionist measures is an open 
question. However, given the full employment that prevailed in those 
economies, it is doubtful whether expansion at a significantly more rapid 
rate could have occurred. 
It is to be hoped that the peak of protectionist pressures already passed 
in the 1970s. Whether in the 1980s LDCs could continue this market 
penetration in the face of increasing protectionism is a difficult question. 
The Japanese reduction in net exports in the relevant commodity groups 
is bound to be less significant than it was. Likewise, there are those who 
believe  that  the  protectionists  may  find  more  effective instruments. 415  Effects of Protection on Developing Countries’ Exports 
Nonetheless, the experience of the 1970s suggests that the main brunt of 
protection falls on those adopting it, and that well-run, open developing 
countries maintain higher rates of economic growth, even in the face of 
protectionism, than developing countries that choose to protect their 
internal markets and rely on inner-oriented growth strategies. 
Notes 
1. See Frank (1977, chap. 1) for a discussion of the emergence of “strong protectionist 
pressures”  in the 1960s. 
2.  Increases in protection  against primary commodities exported by developing coun- 
tries, such as sugar and meat, have, paradoxically, received less attention. They are not 
covered in this paper, but see Duncan and Lutz (1982). 
3.  This possibility also covers the case when B’s  exports are simply transshipped through 
a third country against which there is no quota. Relabeling the origin of  clothing and textiles 
to indicate that they were produced in countries not subject to VERs under the MFA has 
been a frequent means of  evading that agreement. 
4. The secret nature of  VERs and OMAs (orderly marketing arrangements) makes a 
detailed evaluation  of  their  provisions impossible.  Guesses as to the coverage of  these 
restrictive arrangements center around 5 percent of  all manufactured imports from develop- 
ing countries, but much higher proportions for a number of  products-clothing and textiles, 
footwear, and some electronic goods-in  which developing countries have a particular 
interest (Hindley 1980). 
5. An irony of the history of  protection in this sector is that U.S.  agricultural policy in the 
1950s permitted exports of raw cotton-then  the main textile fiber-at  a lower price than 
American textile producers paid. This “unfair advantage” was the rationale for the initial 
textile protection. It, in turn, provided  a rationale for the protection  of  clothing where 
producers suffered a disadvantage because of  textile protection. 
6.  It is not clear whether industries such as steel represent  a comparative advantage 
activity for these countries, or whether they are largely the creations of  distorted policies 
and hence contributors to Brazil’s and Korea’s current problems. 
7.  In the case of  “trigger”  pricing, developing countries with competitive cost advan- 
tages (notably Brazil and Korea) may have had more difficulty entering new markets than 
they otherwise would have, but there were no legal restrictions. 
8. This is as true for Japan as for other countries. For example, the electronics firms that 
received most government support in Japan were not the ones that were the most innovative 
and grew most rapidly. 
9.  Even then, there is the (partial?) offset that VERs gave the rents on import restric- 
tions to the exporting countries. 
10. The data are based on a four-digit International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC), broken down to further subgroups for products of interest to developing countries. 
This enables production, import, and export data to be combined and comparisons to be 
made among the  industrial countries. Trade data have been transformed from the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) to ISIC. Production data for 1980 and in some 
cases 1979 are estimated. Note that these data include primary processed products, notably 
in the food, beverage, and tobacco category that is often excluded from LDC export data. 
Jewelry (i.e., precious stones) is excluded throughout. 
11. Table 11.4 provides a breakdown of growth rates for the two halves of the decade. 416  Helen HughedAnne 0. Krueger 
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Comment  Irving B. Kravis 
The Hughes-Krueger Paradox 
The paper by Hughes and Krueger is both informative and provoca- 
tive. It documents the success of developing countries in expanding their 
exports of manufactured goods into the markets of the developed coun- 
tries. It also points out that the developing countries’ success  in increasing 
their penetration of manufactured goods markets in the developed coun- 
tries was achieved despite protective measures taken by the latter. The 
Hughes-Krueger paradox of increased protective efforts accompanied by 
increased import volumes is explored briefly in this note. It is suggested 
that the explanations may be partly in the dynamic restructuring of the 
world economy that has been in process during the past thirty years and 
partly in the arithmetic involved in the patterns of  industrial country 
protection. These patterns are identified in terms of  the United States, 
but they probably reflect those of  other industrial countries as well. 
Some Key Findings of  Hughes and Krueger 
To bring out these explanations, attention may be called first to three 
of  the empirical findings of  Hughes and Krueger: 
1.  Despite widespread efforts in the United States and other industrial 
countries to increase protection, including some efforts directed against 
products important to the developing countries, the penetration of manu- 
factured  goods imports from all sources into the industrial  countries 
increased from 11.6 percent of the absorption of the manufactured goods 
in 1970 to 17.6  percent in 1980. At the same time the share of developing 
countries in the absorption of manufactured goods in industrial countries 
increased from 1.7 percent to 3.4  percent. About half of  the developing 
country gain would have accrued had the developing countries merely 
maintained their share in the general expansion of  imports in domestic 
markets, but the other half may be regarded as growth at the expense of 
imports from developed country suppliers (see table 11.4). 
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2.  The gains in the exports of  the developing countries appear to be 
widely dispersed among developing countries in general, although the 
Far Eastern developing countries did the best (see table 11.3). Of the four 
nonoverlapping developing  regions  given, the lowest growth  rate  in 
manufactured exports between 1970 and 1980 was 18.9 percent for Latin 
America. 
3.  The commodity composition of  developing country manufactured 
exports to industrial countries shifted toward more sophisticated prod- 
ucts (table 11.2). Between 1970 and 1980 the shares in exports of  food, 
beverages, and tobacco and of  base metals were down sharply while the 
largest increases in shares were for fabricated metal products, machinery, 
and equipment, and for manufactured chemicals, petroleum, coal, and 
rubber products. However, the share of textile and wearing apparel also 
increased, though not as much as the machinery and chemical categories 
just  mentioned.  Furthermore,  these  are  trade-barrier-distorted  in- 
creases; there is a strong presumption that developing country exports of 
textiles and wearing apparel faced larger barriers than their machinery 
exports. But the shift to machinery and chemicals through high growth 
rates did take place. 
The Significance of  the Hughes-Krueger Findings 
As suggested above, these findings point to and are explained by great 
structural changes in the world economy on one side, and by the pattern 
of protection on the other. 
The major change in the world economy is the spread of  modern 
economic growth to most of  the nations of the world. In 1950 the question 
could still be raised whether modern economic growth could be expected 
to spread beyond the countries of  Northwestern Europe and their over- 
seas offshoots. In the ensuing years there has not only been an unprece- 
dentedly high rate of  expansion in the real gross domestic product per 
capita of  the well-established countries (3.2 percent per annum) but a 
growth rate in the developing countries that is not quite as high but still 
remarkable by historical standards (2.8 percent).’ The rate of growth in 
the developing countries during this period exceeded that enjoyed by the 
developed countries in the heyday of their growth in the latter part of the 
nineteenth and early part of  the twentieth centuries. The high growth 
rates of  the last thirty years are also widely diffused. The countries in 
which the growth rate in real per capita GDP has been in excess of  2 
percent  per capita contain two-thirds of  the world’s population.  This 
includes 75 percent of the people living in countries other than the score 
of  industrialized market economies and nearly half of the people living in 
developing market countries. Most of the remaining people of the world 
live in countries that have per capita growth rates between 1  percent and 2 
percent, still well above historical premodern growth rates. 420  Helen HughedAnne 0. Krueger 
The Hughes-Krueger  results concerning the export performance of 
developing countries and their success in penetrating the manufactured 
goods markets of the industrial countries reflects the fact that this growth 
includes the production and export of  manufactured goods. Their data 
show also that the industrial countries have been adapting their import 
patterns to these new facts of  life. As pointed out above, the industrial 
countries  have  accepted  both  greater  import penetration  and larger 
shares in imports from developing countries. Among the three major 
industrial areas the share of  imports coming from developing countries 
increased substantially in the United States and Japan. The increase in 
the developing countries' share of  total imports taken by the European 
Community was much smaller (from 12 percent to 14.5 percent) (see 
table 11.4). For clothing, textiles, and footwear, however, the European 
Community did considerably better in accepting high import shares from 
developing countries. 
The rapid growth in world GDP, the increased penetration of  imports 
in  the markets of  the industrialized  countries, and the expansion  of 
manufactured  goods exports  of  the developing countries have  been 
associated with an extremely rapid growth in world trade. As the figures 
in my table C1l.l show, the expansion in world exports since 1963 has 
been more rapid than the growth of  world commodity production. The 
figures in the table probably tend to underrate the real growth in world 
exports since current values are deflated by unit values rather than true 
Table C.ll.l  Growth in World Commodity Production and Trade, 1963-82 
(average annual percentage changes in volume) 
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export prices.  The tendency for  unit  values to exaggerate the price 
increase for manufactured exports and thus to underestimate the true 
value of  expansion has been documented? 
This is not the  place to try to explain the still more rapid growth of  trade 
compared to  the unprecedentedly high growth rates for output in general, 
but it is easy to believe that the rapid growth provides  a hospitable 
environment for trade expansion. Some of  the improvement in output is 
attributable to lower cost and more convenient means of communication 
and transportation. These changes facilitate the identification of newly 
emerging low-cost locations and the establishment of production at these 
new areas of  comparative advantage. Some part of  the expansion of 
world trade, indeed perhaps a substantial part, is through the mechanism 
of the multinational firm. Multinationals are equipped to scan the world 
more effectively for new advantageous locations and to take fuller advan- 
tage  of  the economies of  scale by  dividing the production  of  parts, 
models, and products among different locations. U.S. majority-owned 
foreign  affiliates (MOFAs) in developing countries, for example, in- 
creased their exports from 8.4 percent of  their sales in  1966 to 18.1 
percent in 1977. The ratio of their 1977 to 1966 exports in current values 
went up 9.5-fold compared to a 6-fold increase for all firms, including the 
U.S. MOFAs, other foreign affiliates, and domestic firms? 
Another factor giving an impetus to the expansion of world trade since 
1973 was the increase in oil prices. Higher prices for undiminished or 
even  (for a time) expanding world oil exports gave the oil exporting 
countries greatly  increased  purchasing power  in  world  markets, and 
stimulated oil importers to supply additional exports that would help 
meet their extra costs for imported fuel. This tended toward a shift from 
domestic absorption  to exporting which  raised  the ratio of  trade to 
production. Continued or expanded growth in some developing coun- 
tries, and in some oil exporting countries as well, was supported by rapid 
debt expansion. 
Why Protection Has Not Bitten Harder 
The powerful tendencies producing the relative expansion of  world 
trade may help explain the upward movement in imports in general and 
imports of  manufactures from the developing countries by the industrial 
countries in particular. Other factors are associated with the pattern of 
protection: 
(a) Products  and product  groups  characterized  by  slow growth in 
consumption are more likely to be claimants for protection in industrial 
countries than fast growing products and product groups. The highly 
publicized list of troubled industries seeking protection might well be 
dwarfed by a list of product and product groups for which protection has 
not been sought. The latter would probably be dominated by sectors of 422  Helen HughedAnne 0. Krueger 
moderate or fast growth products, for which import increases are apt to 
proceed without objection. Furthermore, the protective measures when 
applied are usually confined to a subset of commodities within the vulner- 
able product group, or designed to  protect only one or a few geographical 
market areas rather than the national market, or, finally, (in the “volun- 
tary”  arrangements) aimed only at selected countries of  origin. (U.S. 
protection for steel affords examples of  these limitations in coverage.) 
(b)  For these commodities, market destinations, and market origins 
which are the actual objects of protection, the aim is usually to stop the 
growth of imports or to limit their growth. When there is a cutback, it is 
usually to a recent high level, though not necessarily the highest one. 
These points are illustrated in the papers in this volume. For example, 
Feenstra’s table 2.1 (see chap. 2, this volume) shows that the number of 
automobiles imported under the voluntary export restraint in 1981-82, 
although 9 percent lower than the previous year, was 13 percent higher 
than in 1979 and 17 percent higher than in 1978. 
Two reasons may  be  suggested for the restraints in  the degree of 
protection. One is the desire to adhere to GATT  principles and a liberal 
trading system, to some degree as a matter of  principle and to some 
degree owing to fear of  retaliation. The danger of  retaliation may be 
perceived to be particularly high for products like steel and agricultural 
products, where the main contestants are often large industrial countries, 
each with considerable power to retaliate against protective measures 
taken by the other. While it is true that the developing countries have 
escaped the brunt of the protective drive, except in textiles and wearing 
apparel, their increased share in industrial country imports of textiles and 
apparel suggests that the importance of being unimportant is not the only 
factor operating in favor of  the developing countries. As Hughes and 
Krueger point out, favorable supply capabilities probably have contri- 
buted to their success. 
Another  consideration  constraining  the resolution  of  the  political 
struggle over the amount of  protection accorded to each industry is a 
growing perception of the cost of protection. Hughes and Krueger offer 
the plausible hypothesis that the adverse welfare effects of protection are 
borne mainly by the protection-imposing country. This is more likely to 
be the outcome if supply curves in the countries of origin are elastic, and 
the tendency they describe for exporting countries to escape the effects of 
protection by shifting shipments toward higher quality goods betokens, in 
effect, elastic supply curves. Thus in the United States, the effects of 
protection  of  intermediate products like steel on the prices of  other 
industries, particularly other export industries or on the prices of  con- 
sumer goods like automobiles, seem to have commanded the attention of 
policymakers who have become more concerned with the general com- 
petitive position  of  the U.S.  economy than ever before. The related 423  Effects of Protection on Developing Countries’ Exports 
estimates  of the  cost  to the  nation  of  saving a worker’s job in  the 
protected industries have also received wide circulation. 
Even if  these surmises trying to explain the Hughes-Krueger paradox 
are correct, there is little cause for complacency. If  protection has not 
stopped import growth, it has surely restrained it and diverted imports 
away from channels that market forces would produce. Consumers bear 
extra costs owing to the restraint in import growth, the diversion of 
imports to other (though related) products, and the substitution of higher 
cost sources of  imports as a result of  quotas, some imposed on various 
sources of supply by various countries of  destination and others “volun- 
tarily” agreed to by the countries of origin. There is a trend toward the 
cartelization of  the world economy in which decisions about the location 
of  production for export are made increasingly by international political 
negotiation rather than by market forces. Often the private firms in an 
industry collectively play leading roles in the division of markets, either 
directly or by calling the shots in the official trade battles conducted by 
diplomats or political officials. In a world clamoring for faster growth, 
these spreading tendencies are clearly antigrowth in their effect; they 
diminish the efficiency of  the world economy. Furthermore, a continua- 
tion of depressed economic conditions can be expected to lead to greater 
demands for protection and to broader and more deeply cutting measures 
of protection so that imports from all sources may be more sharply curbed 
in their growth and even in their level. 
Hughes and Krueger did not set out to assess the ability of  the de- 
veloped countries seriously to cut back the import penetration of  their 
markets, including the shares of  developing countries. What they have 
done is to assess the impact of  protective measures taken so far and to 
remind us of the diversity and complexity with which protective measures 
operate. 
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